Review of Economic Design

ISSN: 1434-4742

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Review of Economic Design Q2 Unclaimed

Springer Verlag Germany
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Discover the new Collections site for Review of Economic Design here . It displays open Calls for Papers to Collections as well as published papers from recent and ongoing Special Issues. Information on the newly created RED Young Scholar Prize in memory of Nedim Okan is available in the Journal Updates section. Review of Economic Design explores the art and science of inventing, analyzing, and testing economic, social, and political institutions and mechanisms. The journal applies normative and positive economics and the strategic analysis of game theory, using novel ideas for designing and assembling diverse legal-economic instruments. Among these instruments are constitutions and other assignments of rights; mechanisms for allocation or regulation; tax and incentive schemes; contract forms; voting and other choice aggregation procedures; markets; auctions; and a variety of organizational forms. These designs, the methods of analysis, along with comparative assessments of the performance of known economic systems and implemented designs are all important components of the journal. Officially cited as: Rev Econ Design Explores the art and science of inventing, analyzing, and testing economic, social, and political institutions and mechanisms Applies normative and positive economics and the strategic analysis of game theory Uses novel ideas for designing and assembling diverse legal-economic instruments It has an SJR impact factor of 0,375.

Type: Journal

Type of Copyright:

Languages: English

Open Access Policy: Open Choice

Type of publications:

Publication frecuency: -

Price

2290 €

Inmediate OA

NPD

Embargoed OA

0 €

Non OA

Metrics

Review of Economic Design

0,375

SJR Impact factor

27

H Index

46

Total Docs (Last Year)

59

Total Docs (3 years)

1243

Total Refs

35

Total Cites (3 years)

58

Citable Docs (3 years)

0.5

Cites/Doc (2 years)

27.02

Ref/Doc

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Aims and Scope





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Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions

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A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups

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A reexamination of additivity of power in randomized social preference

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On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure

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Introduction

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Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale

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The condominium problem; auctions for substitutes

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Consistency and its converse: an introduction

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First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge

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The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacques Laffont (Publisher's Erratum)

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He who must not be named

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Network design in games with spillovers

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Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information

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Opportunity analysis of newborn screening programs

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Who consults investment analysts?

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A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements

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On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules

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Core and equilibria in an assembled product industry

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Arbitration systems and negotiations

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Obituary

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Cardinality-based equality of opportunities

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Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations

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The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense

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Interview design for revealing preferences of policy makers

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